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Introduction 
This paper foll0ws an earlier article (Dolan, Jung & Schmidt; 1985) in 
which we examined the production process of higher education. Two aspects 
of the original study serve as the basis f or this paper and th us warrant 
brief review. 
First, we hav·c argued th at educational production does not lend it self 
to analysis as a produ c tion function in the classic sense .1 A simple production 
r endering ignore s the fact that two of th e more important f ac tors, students 
and faculty, enter the process upon conside r able self-selection, especially 
among the more highly qualified of the se input s. This reasoning led us to 
model educational production as a thr ee-equation simultaneous system in which 
the quality of students , faculty, and college output were trea ·ted en9ogenousl~ ·-
The results of that researdi confirmed the st rength of in terdependencies 
existing among the endogenous variables, thus re commending simultaneous 
estimation as the appropriate methodology for evaluating fa ctors rn educational 
productio1i. 2 
The earlier ar.ticlc also introduced a unique measure of educational 
output. Production acro ss baccalaureate in stitutions was measur ed in terms 
of the number of alumni who re ceived Ph.D .'s. The usefulness of this type 
of output measure was noted for its policy implications. Typi cally, income 
or achievement test scores ha,c been used as a proxy for educational output. 
Becau se these data arc specific 10 indiYiduals and no t institutions , previous 
1Th is concept is dis cus~ed bricf l~ by Summers and Wolfe (19 77 , p.6>91. 
although it is not th: focus of that article: . 
21'kGuckin & Winl.;ler (1979. pr . 242-43) ma ke a similar argument for analy sis 
a 1 the intra-uni,crsity level. They cmrh:i size that although a ll students 
ha ve ac cess to the same r otcn1ial IC\e l of uniYCrsit~ res ources. st ud ents 
realize t ha1 po ten ti al at widely d isparate rate s. Their results show th3t 
studie s which treat re so urce s exogenously understate their role rn deter• 
mining student achic\'Cmcnt. 
studies have tended to identify factors that affect individual achievement 
within a single school system or college (Astin, I 968; Bowles, I 970; Summers 
& Wolfe. 1977; McGuc kin & Winkler , 1979). Since institutional 
characteristics have been held constant, differential aptitude, effort, and 
so ci al background ha ve dominated the explanation of variability in student 
achi .evcment. Howe ve r, variance in these latter factors wete arguably less 
pronounced due to the cross-sectional orientation of our sample to exclusively 
private, principall y undergraduate schools . 
differences in in stitu ti onal characteristics 
For this reason , our m od el related 
student and fa cu lt y quality, 
and per capita expen ditures on various fa ce ts of education to differences 
in instituti onal output. Thu s the policy implications, there as ·well as in 
this study, are recommendations for enhancing institution a l pr oduction , not 
individual achievement. 
Largely, the current paper extends the conceptual framework of our earlier 
w ork by applying a data set which is enhanced in significant resp ects. First 
and fore ·most, while retaining the concept of alumni career achie,·ernent as a 
mea sure _of college producti on, thi s output measure is broadened to include 
M.D. and J .D . r ecipien t s.5 The school sample has also been increased to 336 
in sti _tution s. roughly twice t he number in the original study. Beyo nd the 
obv ious advant age of red uced sampling error. this larger sample works to 
correct a sampling bias which might ha ve existed before. The or ig inal source 
Clf school r an k by Ph.D . a lumni was limited t o the top 200 pri,·ate institutions . 
Th .us one might argue th al th e earlier model was in the situation of attempting 
to glean qualitati\C differences be twe en schools which. by virtue of being 
~For a discussion of the applicability of alumni achie,emcnt as a measure 
of institutional output. sec D olan, et al., p. 514. especially Note~-
2 
among the top 200 baccalaureate producers of Ph .D.s, were qualitatively similar, 
at least in a broad sense . The current sample offers greater variance in 
the output measure and thus an improved empirical base for testing our 
simultaneous model of educational production. At the same time , the new 
sample retains its exclusive focus on private , primarily undergraduate 
· institutions. The homogeneity of the sample in this respect is important 
since the structure of .our model implies an administrative utility function 
with arguments, or at least a rank of arguments, which may not be characterize 
university objective function s in general.• 
is enhanced by additional variable s. 
Finally, the current data set 
Generally, the new result s are heartening in the sense that they indicate 
a degree of robustness in our earlier method . Howe ver, thi s extension has 
also afforded an element of self-scrutiny which leads us to suggest an important 
direction for further research in this area. 
I. The Model 
· The production relationship for higher education expresses output (e.g., 
income or GRE scores) as a function of uniYCrsity re sources (e.g., faculty, 
capital plant. ·end owment) and student characteristics (e.g.. SAT scores, 
family background data). In functional form : 
(I) Q = f (R.S) 
where Q. R , and S den ot e outp ut. resour ces, and student characteristics . 
As discussed earlier. a model of higher edu cational product ion must reflect 
4Herc. or course. we refe rrin g to the di f ference in emph as i~ on re search 
and publicati on at major univer s itic.s in relat icin to the administratiYc and 
fac-ultly utility fun c ti c1ns. The impact which a differently oriented sample 
of institutions would have for the structu ral specification of our model are 
c, ·idcnt from Ganin's ( 1980-, cxtcnsiYe the oretical and -empirical treatment 
of university bchHior. See especially Chapter ~ 3, 5. and 6. 
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the broader perspective that the quality of output can influence the quality 
of inputs. and that certain institutional resources may themselves enhance 
the quality of these inputs . To address this interdependence. the relationship 
expressed in Equation (I) is more appropriately specified by the following 
three-equation simultaneous sys t em . 
(2) 
where yi = a vector of three endogenous variables for scho .ol output' (Q), 
student Quality (S), and fa culty quality (F). 
fourteen exogenous variables, a vector of 
representing 
endowment, etc. 
institutional characteristics, 
r = 3x3 matrix of endogenous variable coefficients. 
B = 3x 14 matrix of exogenous coefficients. 
ea.ch generally 
e.g., tuition, 
ui = a vector · of three error terms assumed to be distributed normally 
with .zero mean and constant variance . Errors may be correlated 
across equations. 
= obser vation index for 336 private, undergraduate-oriented 
universities. These are AA UP Category IIA (have diverse 
post-ba ccalaureate program s, but do not engage in significant 
doctoral-level education) and JIB (have diverse baccaiaurcatc· 
k·,el program s, but d o not engage i'n significant post· 
IJaccalaureatc education) schools . 
I mplicitly the model j~ written : 
(3) Q = f~ (S, F , K, AC, AD. FSR, USR, %MSTUD. uQ) 
(4) S = f s (Q, F, T. K. AC , SCH , L , FSR, USR , %MSTUD, u5) 
(5) F =fr (Q , S. E , K , AC, RE . FSR. U SR. NA, GL , W, uf') 
where Q is the numbe r of alumni P h .D., M.D and J .D . recipients : S is the 
third QU3rtile SAT sc0 re o f the enteri ng fre shman cl a ss. and F is assoc i a te 
lcYCI facult y salary. To adju s t f or difference s in school size. mo st obscr-
, ·ations arc expre ssed in per student -capita terms. Details on the listed 
variables appear in Table J. 
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Variablf (X) 
Output (Q) 
Ph .D 
M .D 
J.D . 
St.udents (S) 
F a-:ulty (F) 
Tuiti on (T) 
En do wment (E) 
Cap i t al (K) 
Ac:. demic (AC) 
Rem-,rch (RE) 
Ad miniH rative 
(AD) 
Sc hobrshipr 
(SCH ) 
Loan ! (L) 
Fa e ult \' ' Student 
R ati~ .' (F'SR) 
l1ndt-rfradua tt 
~ r<.:: i:,li r .. t K•n 
Rat;' t · (.L'SR) 
Mu m &, 
Std.De ,· . 
17.60 
H.55 
8 64 
6.74 
1. 73 
18 9 
6 39 
6.93 
1129 .3& 
104.SfJ 
21.E_;4 
2.97 
4 .77 
1.31 
19 .24 
15 .63 
13.•5 
5 .33 
042 
0.28 
1.32 
4.43 
1.62 
071 
1.(19 
0 :72 
S Si 
l .•C· 
Ta ble I: Variables Within the Model 
Mu 
Min 
81.96 
0.72 
48.S l 
.02 
10 05 
.03 
,4.92 
.0( 1 
1500 .00 
720.00 
su o 
H .50 
8.37 
.12 
113.02 
4 .1 1 
3H3 
3.7 G 
2 .31 
.0 4 
52 .05 
.O(• 
6. 7£, 
C. H, 
2 .92 
12 
7 .11 
• .O!'-
l l €: 
H -~• 
J t ,t· {)." 
3; , fl 
+ 
. + 
+ + 
+ .;. 
+ + 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
? 
? 
D,finiti on and Comment 
Alumni C areer achiev ement: ,u m of Ph.D., 
M .D . &: J.D. alu mni u ducribed bel o "'· 
11nd _, ight ed t o refl ect 10 yur period. 
Number of r.lum ni Ph .D . recipie n ll from 
1971- 1980 per JOO 1981 underg rad u at, 
eq uiva lent 1tudentr ."·b 
Number of alumn i M .D. degrees from 1978 
• 1982 per stu dent-c apila.c 
Number of alum ni J .D.1 from d 
1966 - 1977 per st ude nt - c ap ita. 
Th ird qua r tile comp'.>site SAT ,c ore of 
1981 freshme n clasE e 
M ean u lary of MEf' illte profeisors for 
1981- 82 in S l ,000. 
1981 tu ition in Sl, 000. ' 
1981 e ndo•-m ent per s tudent -capita in 
s1,ooo.11 
1961 b ook va lue of th e capital plant 
pe r atud,nt-ca pi ta ,n SJ ,000. g 
19fl ac ad emic eupp-:-rt outlayf per 
et uden t -capita. in Sl ,00 0. Genera lly. a 
1uJ:.ita ntia l part i;,f thiE val ue reOe~tE 
library ex pendi tu re, g 
19/;J research eurp c·rl ou thyE per 
fa cul!y- ca p1t a in S 1.00 (; g 
19fl A dminiEtrat1·,f rnpport outlay, ppr 
etudenl-cap i ta in S l ,000 .g 
1981 Hh olaN hip fund• per student -capi ta 
in S 1,000 g 
I 9E J Etude nt loan fundE p er it udent -ca pi ta 
in S! ,OOt : g 
19~1 fa rnltr r,e, JC•C· full-time 
underpad uate eq u i, ~ie nt, . 
l'nderFadu~ •-~ ,r <<i alirali,:, n r at i~ 
calcvi«te:j a! tlH number of act u~ • 
ful ;-t ,m f undergr a :lvat ,, i:,er JO(! fu i: 
t1mt unciert'r,dua:t e:;uiva lPnts 
( Cnn t inud ) 
Variabl, (X) 
% Ma le Student, 
(%MS T UD) 
Bu~in uE Deg ree 
(%BL 1S) 
Engineer Dei.ree · 
(%Er-:G) 
E ducatio n Degree 
(%ED) 
North A t lantic 
(!'.A ) 
G rea ·t Lakes 
(GL) 
We &lern 
(W) 
Mea n & 
St d. Dev . 
44 .17 
19.0 i 
18 .76 
13.05 
1.70 
6 .23 
8 68 
9 .09 
0 .29 
0 .45 
0.37 
o.•s 
0. 13 
0. 33 
Max 
Min 
JOO.C• 
0.0 
53 0 
0.0 
50 .0 
0 .0 
1.0 
0.0 
1.0 
0.0 
1.0 
0.0 
Table 1: (Continued ) 
+ 
a r ax 
? 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Dd initi on and Cornrn e nl 
f ull-time ma le popul at ion p er 100 or 
u nder gr adu a t e full-t im , populi>tion . 
Ptrcrnt und ergraduate bu r inus majo r, .• 
Pncent undergraduate en gine ering major1 .• 
Percent u nderg ra duate educati on majon .• 
B inary v ar iab leF fN geo i;raphic reg io m . 
TheH b in ari e~ ar<' included to c0nt rol 
for nl ary d ifferenl ial• tha t could be 
att ribu ta ble t o r ei;,ona l cost-of -li ving 
d ifferencef . 
a Undergraduate equivalent p opula tion reflect! t he conver5io n c-! full and part-time unde rgraduate and gr aduate 
st udenlE t o a full-time undergradu ate , tuden l eq u ivalent (FUE) . TheF e sub-p op u lati o n• are weighted ac cordin g to 
the foll owing a lgorithm . 
F UE = [(#Ft; x 1) + (#f'll x .25) ..._ (#FG x 125 ) -t (#PG x .5) ) 
,-·here #Fl 1 i, a number of full - ti m!· underpaduate ~. 'I/FT iE number of parl-tim! unde rg radu ate, . #FG i, numbu of 
fu l!- t im~ graduater . and #PG i, nurnl:,er of patl - t imE· grad u atci . Th i! full- lime equi v ale:il nur , l.•er i£ med in 
ccrnp u tin g a ll per 6tudent-capita obH,vati c,m 
· b Source ; Ba cc i>lau rea te Source~ of Ph .D, Ra n king ! Acc ordin~ to l mtitul i;:,n of Ori.,r, Kat1 o na i Rt~~arch C0uncil. 
B~ lt, more , M aryh,nd . 
c So urce · Acade my of Ameri can M edic;,! College , . Wa,; hington, D.C . 
d So urce . Ameri can Bar F oundali N>. Chica p . llh no i!. 
e Source : Annual SurYey of Colle.eF (Kew Yo rk Th t Colle ge Bo ar ,j In: ., J9f.Z} . 
f Sou rce : A cademe: The Annual Re p:-n or. the Econvm ic Statu! of t he Pr c,feH ion , l9f-J.J 9~~ - 6f' Spe cial !Hut 
(Ju!y -A ug 1982, and Ju ly- Aug 19 83) 
g St'u rce : Hig her E duc at ion Genera l lnforn , a: irc, SurYey (HEGIS X\'I ) (Washinp: ·r., D .C..: l ' ni:d S:ate, Depac:ment 
of Education , 1982 ) . 
Equation (3) posits that successf\t) Ph .D. candidate!. are the product of 
quality human (S, F, AD) and nonhuman (K, AC) resources. Also the . nature 
(USR) and intensity (FSR ) of the human element are deemed impor tant in stirring 
and sustaining p·ost-graduate ambitions. A school's percentage of male students 
(%.MSTUD) is included to adjust for the possibility that MD .s; J.D.s, and 
·Ph .D.s have been male-dominated degrees. 
Equation (4) presents a reduced-form modeling of a somewhat complicated 
market -- the market f or student qualitv. Viewed as an input, students supply, 
and universities compete f or, the quality necessary to enhance institutional 
reputations . Considering the output of the educational process, however , 
students demand and universities supply. Predi ct ions for many of our variables 
are unaffe cted by th is complication. For example , we argue that qualit y 
students are drawn , and institutions vie for them, by repu tat ion as reflected 
in alumni achievement (Q) , facult y quality (F), physical plant (K), academic 
expenditure (AC), and factors indicating emphasis on the student (FSR & USR). 
The predicted signs arc all po sitive. 
Scholar sh ip s and loans (SCH & L) pro\'ide mechanisms for an in sti tuti on 
to "buy" student quality. While one might expect the financial lure to draw 
better students , Ehrenberg and Sherman (1984, · p. 213) find a relatively low 
elasticity on the atiilit) of scholarship in creases by Cornell to draw the 
highest quality applicants fr om schools rn ·ealed by studen ts· acceptance 
decisions to be even more prestigious. Apparently , consumer surrlus exists 
a .t the preferred schools in excess of the schola _rship differential. Were 
this elasticity low enough am ong · our universitic ~. th e linear nature of our 
sys tem could e,in ce a ncgatin coefficient for SCH and L. Therefore , th e 
predicted sign for the se aid variables arc left ambiguous . Tuition (T) is 
6 
another variable which introduces· subtleties in the quality dimension. A 
high tuition should be a deterrent to · all students for an · equal-quality 
product. However, if tuition reflects real or perceived quality differences 
not ·adequately accounted -for by our other variables, then T might exert a 
positive influence. Finally, the proportion . of male students (%MSTUD) is 
included merely as a control for the possibility that males who go on to 
college have dir'ferent SAT cha ra cteristics than do females . We have no 
prediction re garding SCH, L, T, and %MSTUD. 
·Equation (5) employs the average associate professor's salary as our 
measure of faculty ·quality. Salary was chosen because of its availability 
and objectivity of measurement. Furthermore , within the confines of our 
private, undergraduate-oriented sample of universities, this measure is not 
appreciably affected by rew ards for quality research or by disproportionate 
salaries for medical and legal faculty. Thus we assume that salary is a 
university's primary means of attracting and keeping quality faculty in the 
long run. The as sociate level was chosen because these faculty are old enough 
to have establi shed their credentials yet young enough and mobile enough to 
take advantage of them. 5 
. Equati on (5 ) can be viewed as a reduced-form equation of a supply-and-
demand system for faculty quality. On the supply side, qua l ity faculty prefer 
working with potential progeny (Q) and good students (S), cetcris paribus. 
On the institutional demand side. two \'ariables are included to control for 
salary differential s unrelated t o faculty quality . College s with low 
6Reestimati o n o f the sys te m u s ing a ss istant in p lace of ass0 c iate profes sor 
salaries yielded Hry similar result s. This is no t surprising in light of 
the high correlat ions between salarie s a t th e vari o u~ te, ·cl s assistant 
and associate, 0.873; asso c iate and full. 0.927; and a ssi s tant and full, 0.801. 
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undergraduate · specializ.ation ratios (USR) are predicted to have higher average 
salaries because of the higher salaries paid to graduate professors, especially 
law professors. Further, we anticipate salaries to be higher in the North 
Atlantic (NA), Western ( \\'), and Great Lakes (GL) regions vis-a-vis the Southeast 
because of cost-of-living differences . The remaining variables affect both 
s·upply and demand. The size of an institution's endowment (E) represents 
financial securit y to faculty and ability•to-pay by institutions, both · positive 
influences. Other variables have offsetting influences resulting in ambiguous 
predictions for the reduced-form coefficients . While faculty . might prefer 
better physical facilities (K) and higher academic expenditures (AC), insti· 
tutions might view them as substitutes for faculty . And while faculty m ight 
prefer higher research support (RE) and smaller classes (FSR), administration 
might view these as income-in-kind . 
The foregoing discussion applies to the model as cast in our earlier 
article . For purpose s of comparison , we re-estimate this model using the 
composite career achievement measure and _ the enlarged sample of schools . We 
then consider an expanded the model. The additional variables in the expanded 
model are des c ribed at the end of Table I. N ote that the percent of 
undc_:rgraduate s maj o ring in business (%BUS). engineering (%ENG), and education 
(%ED) are added to the output (Q) and faculty (F) equations. The purpose of 
these variable s is to contr o l f or any non-qualitati,c impact that particular 
vocational orientati ons of scho ols might have on institutional output and 
faculty quality as defined here. For example, the emphasis of our output 
measure on graduate degree s might unfairly reflect the production of schools 
with high percentages of the busin ess. engineering. or education majors since 
these undergraduate degrees are often terminal. Jn term s of the faculty 
8 
equation, such vocational curricula have staffing requirement s which migh t 
imply salarv differentials which should not be interpret~d as d iffe rence s 
in faculty quality rn general. Rather, such differences may be more 
attrib utable to segmentation between these quasi -professional labor markets 
vis-a-vi s th e more traditional academic d isciplines. Thi s control seems 
espe cia ll y appropriate in the case of business and engineering facultie s. 
On a more techn ica l note, each equ ati on in both system s is overidentified 
th rough the use of zero restri ctio ns. We excluded an exo~enous variable 
fr om an equation when we could fin d no the oretical justific~tion fo r it s 
inclusion other than its influence on another end ogenous variable. As example s, 
th e size of a school's endowment might alter output but only thr ough 
facili tat ing capital expans ion, scholarships , facu lty salaries , and so forth. 
Similarly, tuit ion, research expenditures , scholarships, and loans affect 
student and faculty decisions but not output, ceteris paribus. And endowment 
is excluded from th e student quality equation since the manifestations of 
a large endowment (campus bea uty, fa culty size and quality ) are much more 
obviou s to student s th an is the endowment its elf. Th e identification issue 
is considered furthe r in Section Ill. 
II . Empirical Results 
Table 2 contains three set s of results for th e endogenous vari a bles Q. 
S, and F. Mode l I reproduces the findin gs of our original study (Q = Ph .d.'s , 
n = 174). Model 2 is identical in speci fication but is estimated with t he 
multiple -de gr ee output measure and en larged sample size (Composi te Q. n = 
336 ). Mod el 3 is exp an ded to in corr 0ratc the new variable s which con tr ol 
for vocationally or iented curri cula in th e output and faculty equations . 
Th e models arc estimated with a three-stage technique as a correction for 
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Table 2: Results of Thrce- S1age Least Squares Estimation 
Mod•I l: Mod •I 2: M odel S: 
Q= PhD ' ,; n- I 74 ~Omi!Olil• 2 , n - 83(', ~Ol!J22fil• !;I· n-8~2 
Vuiabl, \ Equat ion Q s r Q s r Q s F 
Outp~l (Q) -3 .52 0.01 0.75 -0 .08 2.48 .. -0 .10 
( 1.59) (0 .19) (0 .66) ( 2 .0 •) (2.74) (2 .1>6) 
Student (SJ -0 .02 0.02•• o.os• o.oc•• 0.05 • o.o,•• 
(1.13) (BS) (18 0) (9.68) (1.82) (10. 38 ) 
f aculty (f) -1.H' 21.98 .. 1.29• 22 .90' 0 0.87 18 .40 .. 
(2 .04) (4. 12) (l.69) (6.3 5) (1.10) (4.97) 
Tuit .ion (T) 29.72 .. 6.6( 11.42 
(4.00) (1.2 4) (1.18) 
End o wment (E) 0 .05 •• o.o,• o.oc• 
(l.95) ( 1.98) (2 .07) 
Capital (K) 0.08 2.CS • -0 .12 .. 0.8 1 • 8.82 .. . o.J7• • 0.20 2,41 • -0 .16 .. 
(0.07) (l.91) ( 2 .86) {l.87) (2 .68) (!!.7 4) (1.32) (2.09) (8 .62) 
Academic (AC) 3.%·. 46.H • -0.35 6.2a• • -1376 0.83 6.9 •• • -26 .03 1.0 ( 
(2 .A9) (US) (0 6 2) (2.90) (0 .69) (l.18) (3.43) (1.41 ) (1.6 1) 
Ruearth (RE) 0 .03 0 .01 0,02 
(113) (1. H ) (1.24) 
Admin i~tra tion 3_92• • 2.98. • 1.87 ** 
(ADM) (459} (3.52) (2.45) 
ScholatShip -3 ~.72 .. -1.62 -3.60 
(SCH) (2 . 77) (0.26) (0.56) 
Loam (L) -8 .89 2.36 UH 
(l.63) (0.76} (0.42) 
Fa cu lty /Stud ent 2.09 .. 22 _93 •' -0.57 .. 1.64 .. l.62 -0 .10 1.s2 •• -1.85 -0 .0 4 
Rati o (FSR ) (03) (3: l 5) (2.80) (2.~4) (0.!13) (0 .60) (261) (0 .29) (0 22) 
Undergraduate 0 16 .. 1.1s ·· -0 .0• • • 0. 20 ·' 0.49 -0 .02 0.16 .. 0.0 4 -0 .01 
Special. (USR) ( 3.3 l) (!I.OS) (2.58) (3.85) (0 .97) (1.19) (337) (0 .10) (0.76) 
% Mal e Student, o.oo· 0 .?2 .. O.le .. 0.31 o.n• • 0.05 
(%MSTUD) (2.30) (2.83) (6 23) (1.25) {7 11) (0. 19) 
% Bu,ineH -0 .18 .. 0.01 
Maj on (%B1..iS) (3 23) (0.92} 
~. Engin~erini;: -0 .25 •• 0 .00 
Maj ore (%Er,;G ) (3 .4? ) (0 .27) 
% Educat ion -0 .05 -0 .02 
Maj oN (%ED) (0.71) (1.51) 
. North Atl anlic o.s~ • 0.1 i 0.28 
Slate (NA) (2.13} (0 .84 ) (129) 
G real Lake! · 0 .61' -0 .0£' -0.02 
State (GL) ( I 73) (0 .69) 0 .12 
We ~lern 0.94 ' -0.2: -0 .18 
State (W) {200) (1.17) (0 .71) 
lnlrrcept -!7.3o ·· 5;_59 • ' 7 .9i . • -11 J.5(' •e 1.1 s -17 .73 -95 .27 642 .89 -21.2 2 
( s. 7£,) (0 .51) (2 .59) (Ii 90) (U9) (3 .51) ( 6 41) {6.18) (Ot\} 
Standard Err o r 5.20 68 .28 1.93 IUf; 77.0 2 3 0 4 8.09 72.96 S.H 
};c;,te: J\;umbeN in parrnthe•e• ar< t -, ·alueE . Denolef 1ignifiranct at the 0 .05 lrvet .. Denolu 1ignificance at th• 0 .0 1 leYel. 
the presence of error correlation across equations , 
In light of the rather extensive scaling of variables as described in 
Table l, it is useful to . explain briefly the intuitive interpretation of the 
parameter estimates. Consider the coefficient ,05 for student quality (S) 
in the output equation (Q) of Model 2. This coefficient suggests that a 
school . with I 000 full-time undergraduate-equivalent students (FUE) raises 
its output of MD., J.D., and Ph.D. alumni by .5 per decade for each J point 
increase in the third quartile SAT score of the entering freshman class. 
Thus, a l 00 point increase in SAT results in 50 more graduate-degree alumni 
per decade .6 In a similar vein, the coefficient on Academic expenditure 
suggests that a $10,0 00 increa se in outlays (i.e. $1000 / 100 FUE enrollment 
where, for ex.ample, FUE = 1000) would raise alumni output by 62.8 per decade. 
Generally speaking, the correct interpretation of the coefficients requires 
careful recollection of the fact that inputs are scaled per JOO FUE students, 
and output 1s per FUE students per decade . 
We turn now to a comparison of the re su lt s obtained in Models I and 2. 
Generally, the results rn the output equation (Q) in both mod els foster a 
rather paipable notion of the baccalaureate process culminating in successful 
graduate-degree candidates. Note that facult y qualit y (F), academic (AC) 
and admini strative (AD) support, a hi gh faculty-student ratio (FSR), and 
undergraduate specialization (USR) are all statistically significant inputs 
in undergraduate pr oduct ion as measured by alumni career achievement. In 
short, the parameters in the output equati-ons in Mode ls I and 2 suggest a 
6This and subsequent illu stration s co nsider only direct effects while 
holding o-ther endogenous va ria bles constant. HoweYcr. due to the significance 
of other endogenous var ia bles, the tota l effect through out th e system is 
actually greater . 
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production relationship in which relatively well•paid professors with relatively 
small classes and good librar ies combine with a well·financed administratio .n 
in a ia rgely undergraduate environment to produce doctoral and Jaw candidates . 
In a broad sense, the original model appears relatively robust. Moving 
from a single to a mult iple•carcer output measure, along with the increased 
· sample, ha s not dramaticall y altered the results of the output equation . 
Nonetheless; there are several noteworthy differences which surface. Certainly 
the most encouraging of thes .e is that student quality, pre vious ly negative and 
insignificant in Model I, become ·s positive and significant . in Model 2. 
Obviously, thi s was one striking anomaly within our original f in dings. At 
that time , we conjectured that the seemingly inc onsequen tial role of student 
quality on output might be accounted for by the use of median composite SAT 
score. We suggested that median st·udent quality might not be a good indicator 
of academic potential which is latent in, say, only the upper · qua rtile of 
. the · student populati on. Acc ordingly, the re, ·ised data set casts studen t 
quality as third quartile SAT scores. Th e new student quality coefficient 
in the output equation appears to corroborate the conceptual importance of 
the data adjustment. 
A comparison of th e student quality equations in Model I and 2 reveal s 
that the impact of the enhanced data set is mixed. In Mode l l , th e significant 
parameters indicate that better students are drawn to schools wh ere the 
undergraduate rati o is high, classes are small, and the quality of facult y 
is high . For example. in Model I the direct impact of a $1.000 increase in 
assoc iate profe ssor salar~ is to rai!>e median SAT sco re of the entering class 
by 21.98 point s. Further. note that th e st rong fa culty impact suryivc s with 
remark able uniformity in Model 2. Similarly. the physica l amenities of the 
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campus as measured by the capital sto ck (K) display comparable drawing power 
for quality students in both models . However, observe that the faculty/student 
rati o (FSR) and undergr aduat e specialization ratio (OSR), both highly 
significant variables in the original estimation, fall out in Mod el 2. The 
dr op in significance of FSR and USR with the broader output measure might 
suggest that the mot ivation to pursue a Ph.D. is more closely related to the 
intimacy of th e undergraduate experience than in the case of doctors and 
lawyers. 
Regarding the fa culty equation ~ recall from the discussion in Section I 
that this equation cou ld be viewed as a re duced-form equation from a 
supply-and-demand system for fa culty quality . Generally, the · results support 
this interpr etation . Observe that, fr om a supply perspective, quality students 
and the financial security of a school's endowment appear to draw quality 
faculty . From a fact or demand standpoint, th e uniformly negative and signi-
ficant sign on capital in both models suggests that administrators view the 
quality of th e ph ysical fa cilities as a substitute for quality faculty . 
Furthermore, th e resou rce tr ade-off between _well paid f aculty and class siz.e 
1s suggested by the significant negative coefficient on facult y-student rati o 
in Model I, · although this relationship fades in Model 2. Similarl y, the 
high er resource costs of graduate vis-a-Yis undergraduate fa culty is implied 
by the significant negative coefficient on undergraduate specialization ratio, 
but this relationship also wanes in Model 2. 
As an interim summary, one might conclude th.at , despite certain exceptions. 
the simultaneous model of col lege produ ction sun·i, ·es rather well using the 
compos ite career output measure and expanded sample .- Th e next phase of thi s 
study is foreshadowed in Model 3. We plan to extend the model with re spect 
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to additional variables and, possibly, a fourt~ equation. Such an extension 
necessitates additional estimation considerations . 
discussion of Model 3 results until the next section. 
Consequently, we defer 
III. Estimation Considerations 
An important finding in our earlier study was the substantial amount of 
simultaneity among our three endogenous variables. In contrasting ordinary 
least-squares (OLS) esti mate s with three· stag e lea st-squar es (3SLS) estimates, 
we observed that coefficients for exogenous variables remained broadly similar 
in sign, magnitude, and significance under both te chniques. Howe ver, coef • 
ficient s for th e endogenous variables changed markedl y. Under OLS, student 
quality (S) was positively and significantly related to output (Q) while 
faculty quality (F) was not . As ca n be seen for Model 1 in Table 2, these 
roles were reve rsed in the 3SLS results . Furthermore , while un iversity 's 
output level appeared to attract quality students under OLS, it was statis-
ti cally insign ificant in simultaneous estimation. Finally, the coeffic ient 
for f aculty quality in the student equation of Model I was d ouble that of 
the OLS estimate. 
Expl aining the cause for these changes required considerat ion of both 
potential sources of bia s in OLS estimation: correlation of endogenous vari-
ables with the error term. as well as th e correlation of errors across equa-
ti ons. Examination of the statistical significance of the endogenous variables 
together with the estimated cr oss-eq uation correlations led us to conclude 
that the latter provided the dominant source of bias in the OLS estimates. 
Ha,ing con, ·inced our selves of the need for simu ltaneous estimation. we 
now conside r. in a preliminary manner, sneral other econ ometri c issues. The 
first of thes e is the sensitivity of our re sul ts to the instrumental vari3blcs 
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we: utiliz.c . This issue arise~ because in the process of expanding our sample. 
we have also coHcctcd a number of additional variables . While it is premature 
. to incorp or ate most , the distribution of the student body by major has been 
checked and cleaned. Thus , Model 3 in Table 2 differs from Models l and 2 
by its inclusion of the percents of the student body majoring in business , 
engineering , and education . As anticipated, the larger the portion of ~tudents 
majoring in business and engineering , the lower is college output as we define 
it . Surprisingl y, however, a school's focus on these majors appears to play 
no statistically significant role in · faculty salary determination . More 
interesting from the present perspective, is the effect of these additiona l 
instruments on the endogenous variables. The role of output in attracting 
quality students increase s from insignificant in Model 2 (coefficient of 
0.75 with a t-value of 0.65) to substantive in Model 3 (2.48 with t-value of 
2.74) . Other changes are less dramatic. Apparently, the instruments chosen 
are important in this model. 
Furthermore, the exclusion restrictions used for identification may 
have an impact on parameter estimates. A set of estimates whkh are not 
presented are the results when inc lud ing these majors in all three equati ons. 
Model 3 excludes them from the student quality equati on because we can sec 
no strong reas on why business , en ginee ring or education students should, on 
a veragc, be better or wor se in composite SAT than other students. Nevertheless. 
we are int eres ted in the impact of their inclusion on our estimates. Jn 
comparison with Mode l · 3, student quality drops to insignificance in th e outrut 
equation , and output drop s to insignificance in the ~tudent equation Clearl y. 
the manner in which the model is overidcntif ied affects parameter estimates. 
A third econometric issue might help to resolve the first tw o 
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Specifically, the endogenous variables in this system might be treated better 
as unobservable . For example, the quality of university output, even under 
our restricted definition of career achievement, cannot be observed directly 
for the typical student. Consequently, we have used subsequent Ph .D. M.D., 
or J.D. attainment as an indicator of career achievement. Unfortunately, 
this number is affected by factors unrelated to quality. For example, our 
-output measure is biased against predominantly female institutions and 
institutions specializing in· the aforementioned vocationally-oriented majors. 
Similarly, the use of faculty salary . as an indicator of the appropriate latent 
variable, faculty quality , has much to commend it. Nonetheless, many factors 
influence salary be yond quality in the contcll.t of undergraduate education . 
Cost-of-living differentials, market discrepancies by discipline, and higher 
graduate-faculty salaries all impact on the average salary at a school. 
Controlling for these factors in the structural equations actually "controls 
them into" the reduced · form equations . Consequently, the second and third 
stages estimators retain these undesired , non-quality influences . 
As we consider more of these factors, we propose to reformulate the 
model in an unobservables context. In particular, the LISREL 7 (linear 
st ru ctura l relationships) model will be employed. LJSREL is a full-informat ion, 
maximum-likelihood technique which considers a measurement model for latent 
endogenous and / or exogenous variables within the broader context of a srstem 
of structural equati ons. For example , the measurement equation for faculty 
quality might specif ied as: 
(6) SALARY = b0 + b 1 (LA TENT-F) + b7 USR + b3 %BUS + b4 %ENG 
7See Jores~og and Sorb orn (] 984) for a detailed di scus sion of the LISREL 
model , its assumpti ons, and the computer program. 
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+ b 5 %ED + v. 
where v is a disturbance assumed to ·be normally distributed with zero mean, 
constant variance, and independent of errors in the structural equations . 
LATENT-F would then be used in place of SALARY for faculty quality (F) in 
the structural model. 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
This paper represents an intermediate product in an ongoing modeling of 
the higher educational process .at private, predominantly undergraduate 
institutions. Looking to the past , thi s paper extends an earlier article by 
expanding the universe of schools to the full set instead of merely the best 
225 in terms of baccalavreate Ph.D.'s. Correspondingl y, we have nearly d_oubled 
the sample size. We have also broadened the career achievement measure to 
include MD.'s and J.D.'s in addition to Ph.D.'s. The results have been 
encouraging . The composite picture of the earlier study survives. The role 
of human capital in the form of students, faculty and administrators emerges 
even stronger than previously. Academic expenditures continue to buttress 
the human element , while capital is apparently more important to the preparation 
for medical and legal studies than for the Ph.D. 
Looking to the future , this paper has considered several econometric 
compl icat ions of expanding the model. By examining a preliminar y extension, 
we have concluded th at parameter estimate s for the endogenous variables arc 
affected by both th e instruments selected and the exclusion restrictions 
imposed . These addit iona l instrument s were included to control non-qualitative _ 
influen ces out of the model. Ind eed, several such cont rols arc already in 
the model and many of th e variab les under consideration als o fall into this 
categ ory. Unfortunately, three-stage lea st-squares estimation does not rem ove 
)7 
such .influences from the model. This has led us to consider an alternative 
estimation strategy. We intend to recast the current endogenous variables 
as merely the observed effects of the true, but unobserved, quality measures. 
Such a treatment will enable us to control adequatel y for non-qualitative 
differences between their observed counterparts. 
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